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BORDER PATROL: REFLECTIONS ON

THE TURN TO HISTORY IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Laura Kalman*

T

INTRODUCTION: Ti

TuRN TO HISTORY

HE resurgence of American history is evident everywhere-from
literary theory to television. Just consider the work of Michael
Sandel. In 1982, his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,' bewailing
the loss of self-government and community, played an important role
in spreading the "republican revival," which swept history, philosophy, and political theory across a range of disciplines. His new book,
Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy,2
("Democracy's Discontent") makes the same argument, but his focus
has shifted. Well over half of Democracy's Discontent is devoted to a
survey of American history from the early republic to the present,
with an eye to discovering when the forces of good-that is, republicanism-were overtaken by those of liberalism. Further, Sandel argues that "the key features of contemporary liberalism-rights as
trumps, the neutral state, and the unencumbered self" 3-not only
have come to dominate constitutional law but have spread out from
there "to set the terms of moral and political debate."I Here, Sandel
has taken a leaf from some law professors, who have placed both history and, ostensibly, the revolt against liberalism at the heart of constitutional theory.
The very vitality of history has made the last decade a busy one for
historians. We history police have patrolled our turf, guarding our dis* Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. This article was
the basis of the Robert L. Levine Lecture delivered at Fordham University School of
Law on March 20, 1997. I am very grateful for the hospitality of the Fordham faculty
on that occasion, and especially for the kindness and excellent criticism of James
Fleming. An earlier version of this article was delivered at the USC Law School
Faculty Workshop, where it was brilliantly critiqued by Nomi Stolzenberg. I also
thank Scott Altman, John Blum, David Cruz, Jody Enders, Barry Friedman, W. Randall Garr, Ariela Gross, Gregory Keating, Pnina Lahav, and David Marshall. Finally,
I am grateful to the editors of the Fordham Law Review for allowing me to keep
parentheticals to a minimum. In omitting as many parentheticals characterizing cited
sources as possible, I cast my allegiance with those who would resist "the tyranny of
the paraphrase" and encourage readers to ask questions of, express ideas about, and
be inspired by texts. See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of
Paraphrase:Talking Back to Texts, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 163, 165, 168 (1993).
1. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).
2. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy (1996).
3. Id at 116.
4. Id at 108.
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ciplinary borders against the encroachment of others. 5 Even our attempts at hospitality have been lame. To borrow from Terrence
McDonald, historians have too often reinvented and reinforced the
boundaries between history and other disciplines, even as we have
pretended to speak across them.6
In The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism,7 ("Strange Career") I
joined the historians prowling the borders. There, I argued that law
professors seized upon the historiography of republicanism in the
1980s in an effort to recapture the politics of the Warren Court, resolve
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" that dogged constitutional theory,8 respond to the Reagan Administration's embrace of originalism,
jump on the Sandel bandwagon, and embrace interdisciplinarity. The
republican revival in constitutional theory, so often seen as a rebellion
against liberalism, also represented a renewal of liberalism-originalism for law professors whose political orientation might be described,
however imperfectly, as one of "sixties liberalism." The book developed from a sense that an epistemological crisis was going on in the
legal academy and reflected an attempt to focus on one area-constitutional theory-where it seemed acute. Strange Career represented
an effort to explore the implications of the crisis for "legal liberalism,"

5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Literary Criticism and the Politics of the
New Historicism, in The New Historicism 213 (H. Aram Veeser ed., 1989); Robert B.
Toplin, History on Television: A Growing Industry, 83 J. Am. Hist. 1109 (1996); see
also Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse
(1995); History and . . . Histories Within the Human Sciences (Ralph Cohen &
Michael S. Roth eds., 1995); The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Terrence J.
McDonald ed., 1996) [hereinafter The Historic Turn].
6. Terrence J. McDonald, What We Talk about When We Talk about History: The
Conversationsof History and Sociology, in The Historic Turn, supra note 5, at 91, 11213.
7. Laura Kalman, Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (1996) [hereinafter Kalman, Strange Career].
8. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16 (1962). With those words, Bickel enshrined what Erwin Chemerinsky has called "the majoritarian paradigm" in constitutional theory: "the philosophy ... that American democracy means majority rule; that the legislatures and
executives are majoritarian, but the Court is counter-majoritarian; and that as a result,
the Court should invalidate government actions only when they violate clear constitutional principles that exist apart from the preferences of the Justices." Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 43, 60 n.77 (1989) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution]. This was unfortunate because it ensured the dedication of constitutional theory
to the search for a solution to a problem which did not exist. To quote Chemerinksy
again, "the key error in much of constitutional scholarship is that it begins with a
definition of democracy that does not correspond to the American Constitution. The
Constitution is based neither on a concept of democratic rule that is purely
majoritarian nor on an assumption that all policies must be chosen by electorally accountable officials." Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question:
An Essay on ConstitutionalScholarship and Judicial Review, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1207,
1232-33 (1984); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution (1987).

1997]

BORDER PATROL

that is, faith in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
to bring about wide-ranging social and political reform.
This article is another exercise in border patrol It explores how
historians do, and to use one of law's favorite words, "should," react
to the legal community's use of their work for originalist purposes.
Part I describes the rise of legal liberalism and its vicissitudes. It
shows how the Reagan Administration's embrace of originalism deepened the crisis of legal liberalism. Part II examines how law professors left-of-center used the republican revival as an originalist
response to the problems of legal liberalism and how historians reacted. Part III contends that, for all the sophistication toward historical scholarship these law professors of the republican revival have
shown, the republican revival is an example of the "law office history"
historians love to hate. It also suggests that, regardless of whether the
republican revival is legal liberalism by another or an authentic alternative to legal liberalism, it is of limited use. Part IV urges historians
who sympathize with legal liberals to recognize the rhetorical value of
originalism for constitutional discourse. Part V distinguishes between
"lawyers' legal history," of which originalism is one example, and "historians' legal history." It claims that the two varieties of history are
equally valid and examines some instances in which historians have
worked with liberal law professors to develop originalist arguments.
Part VI both warns the law professors and historians who are working
on a more credible originalism that they are playing with fire and exhorts them to continue doing so. In the conclusion, I argue that both
historians and law professors should recognize originalism as a necessity-for now.

9. I draw my definition of legal liberalism from Gerald Rosenberg, who critiqued
its assumptions and effectiveness. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can

Courts Bring about Social Change? 4 (1991). "Legal liberalism" is often referred to as
"liberal legalism." David Trubek has provided a definition of "liberal legalism" that
emphasizes its links to the liberalism of the 1960s: "To be a liberal ...
meant favoring
a stronger role for the state in the economy, moderate redistribution of income, state
action to improve the lot of the disadvantaged, legal protection for the accused and
mentally ill, and legal bans on racial discrimination." David Trubek, Back to the Futur" The Shor, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 Fla. St. U. L.Rev. 4,
8 (1990). To be legalist meant maintaining the "faith in law as an instrument of progressive social change." Id. at 9. Legalists, such as Lyndon Johnson and Earl Warren,
assumed that "most of the 'flaws' in American society could and would be corrected
through legal means. They had faith in the immanent liberalism of legal institutions
and equated 'law' with 'freedom' and 'equality."' Id. There was a foreign policy dimension as well, which entailed the exportation of "democratic capitalism." Id. at 23.
In short, the liberal legal agenda was one of legal, social, political, and economic reform at home and globalism abroad to preserve capitalism and fight poverty and injustice. Because I find the term "liberal legalism" pejorative, I refer to it as "legal
liberalism."
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CRISIS OF LEGAL LIBERALISM

Because of the nation's experience with the Warren Court, legal liberalism has been linked to political liberalism since mid-century. 10
Like legal realism, the Warren Court asked whether principled decision-making and objective foundations of justice existed. But that issue barely bothered the children of the legal realists-the legal
liberals-who dominated the law professorate between World War II
and the Vietnam War and who shared the politics of the Warren
Court. One group of law professors, those identified with the Legal
Process school, tempered praise for the results that the Warren Court
reached with concern over its "subjectivity," pointing to the "countermajoritarian difficulty," the alleged conflict between an expansive notion of judicial review-especially when perceived to be exercised idiosyncratically-and majoritarian concepts of democracy, and urging
the Court to become more craftsmanlike. Members of another group
devoted themselves to writing elaborate apologies for the Court's judicial activism, arguing that the counter-majoritarian difficulty posed
no problem for a Court so obviously committed to furthering the
causes of democracy and social justice. Both groups, however, appreciated the substance of the Warren Court's decisions and shared its
faith in law as the key to progressive social change.1
Outside the law schools, the right's demonization of the Warren
Court for expanding individual and civil rights only helped matters.
Because it attracted so much fire, the Warren Court fostered solidarity
among law professors and law students. The revolts that rocked campuses left the law schools "relatively untouched."'"
At the end of the 1960s, then, liberalism fared better in law than it
did in politics and other disciplines. Law professors celebrated the
greatness and courageousness of Warren and his Court when Warren
surrendered the Chief
Justiceship in 1969. The Warren Court became
3
"judicial Camelot.'
As the Warren era ended, however, it seemed that the judicial activism it practiced, which helped constitute its legal liberalism, had not
fared as well as legal liberalism. Although law professors were encouraged by the early Burger Court, their enthusiasm waned by 1973.
10. I emphasize that I mean "political liberalism" not in the sense that John Rawls
has recently used the phrase, but in the amorphous sense it has been used in political
discourse. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 3-47 (1993).
11. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 26-50; Barry Friedman, Neutral
Principals: A Retrospective, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 503, 507-25 (1997).
12. Paul N. Savoy, Towards A New Politics of Legal Education, 79 Yale LJ. 444,
444 (1970); see also Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 50-53 (describing the
atmosphere in law schools).
13. See Russell L. Caplan, The Paradoxes of JudicialReview in a Constitutional
Democracy, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 451, 456 (1981). I discuss the travails of liberalism in
other disciplines and the celebration of the Warren Court in Kalman, Strange Career,
supra note 7, at 50-59.
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They were annoyed by the Court's "rootless activism,"' 4 or "Lochnering,' 15 its constitutional theory of fundamental rights, and decisions
such as Roe v. Wade, 6 "the already classic example of judicial usurpation and fiat without reason." 7 Legal liberals' agenda, as many saw it,
was to develop a way of identifying principled decisions that rationalized the Warren Court, demonstrated that principled decision-making
and objective foundations of justice prevailed, and provided a basis
for its continuation. They would show that the "paradigmatic" decision for their generation,'" Brown v. Board of Education,' was correctly decided. At the same time, they would say something
important about the two Anti-Christs of constitutional law-Lochner
v. New York,20 whose results and reasoning they reviled, and Roe v.
Wade, whose results they held in high regard, but whose reasoning
they despaired of justifying.
The introduction of new political and disciplinary perspectives
made legitimating legal liberalism difficult. In 1972, thirty-four of the
thirty-eight law professors at Harvard defined themselves as McGovern supporters,2 ' but by the end of the 1970s, law faculties were attracting individuals with more diverse politics. New perspectivesranging from the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") critique of rights to
the Law and Economics demonstrations that efforts at reform only
hurt the intended beneficiaries-posed new challenges for legal liberalism at the same time that affirmative action fragmented it. Further,
with the job market for humanists and social sciences collapsing, individuals who would have become humanists and social scientists in a
becoming law professors, thereby making
better market were instead
22
fashionable.
and"
"law
Legal liberals tried to make use of the new interdisciplinarity. For
instance, Frank Michelman reached out to Rawls, attempting to bolster his argument for constitutionalizing welfare rights. As many
noted, though, Rawls only proved helpful to those predisposed to14. See Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Warren Court, in The Burger

Court: The Counterrevolution That Wasn't 198, 211 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1984).
15. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 Yale L. 920, 944 (1973) (describing "Lochnering" as the Supreme Court's ability
to "ram[] its personal preferences down the country's throat").
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Gary C. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1361, 1437 (1979).
18. Robert M. Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protectionof Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287, 1316 (1982).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 77.
22. See id. at 60-93.
23. See Frank L.Michelman, The Supreme Cour, 1968 Term-Foreword"On Protecting the Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 14-15 (19691970).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

wards his politics,' and, ultimately, the new disciplinary perspectives
simply created more problems for legal liberals, particularly in the
1980s. For example, I have said that the legal liberals' concern in the
aftermath of the Warren Court was to demonstrate the possibility of
objective foundations of justice; but in the deconstructionist moment
of poststructuralism, the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity just
seemed to be quintessential expressions of the old metaphysics.
The net result of this political and interdisciplinary ferment was to
leave legal liberals and their constitutional theory-with its obsession
with objectivity, principle, and the counter-majoritarian difficulty-at
a dead end. 26 By the mid-1980s, the legal liberals' jeremiads had begun: Paul Carrington's attack on CLS,27 Bruce Ackerman's publication of Reconstructing American Law, 28 and Owen Fiss's despairing
lecture on The Death of the Law. 29 Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration launched its originalism campaign.
A few law professors, such as Ronald Dworkin, saw no legitimate
30
role for "originalism" in constitutional discourse from the beginning.
They beat a drum roll of disgust that has echoed to the present. For
example, James Fleming has written eloquently that "[o]riginalism, as
an ism, has no firm footing in our constitutional culture, and it has no
place there."' 3' For Fleming, originalism "is a species of authoritarianism that is antithetical to a free and equal citizenry. A regime of purportedly dispositive original meanings is, at best, beside the point of
constitutional interpretation, and, at worst, an authoritarian regime
that is unfit to rule a free and equal people. '32 Although I agree that
originalism has authoritarian tendencies, my essay is based on a premise with which Fleming and other reasonable people may disagreethat though Fleming may not have made a place for originalism in
constitutional culture, his ilk has; and, indeed, other law professors
have made originalism a (not necessarily the) preeminent mode of
constitutional discourse. Therefore, I believe it useful for the legal
liberals, whose politics I share, to take originalism seriously and to
24. See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1307,
1316-17 (1979).

25. Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 94-131.
26. One of the early indications that legal liberalism was headed towards a dead
end was law professors' admiring but skeptical reaction to John Hart Ely, Democracy
and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980) [hereinafter Ely, Democracy and
Distrust]. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 87-90.
27. See Paul 0. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222, 226-27
(1984).
28. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (1984).
29. See Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1986).
30. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principal 34-57 (1985).
31. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1335, 1355 n.89 (1997) [hereinafter Fleming, Our Imperfect Constitution].
32. Id
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develop an originalist strategy of their own as one component of their
array of strategies.
First, what is "originalism?" As Martin Flaherty has observed, "[i]f
ever a term muddied as much as it clarified, 'originalism' is it."133 In
this essay, I follow Flaherty in broadly defining "originalism" as the
effort to show fidelity to the Constitution by preserving "privileged
meanings from earlier eras of constitutional lawmaking."'
Thus,
"originalism" refers not only to the narrow and intentionalist interpretive strategy of Edwin Meese, 35 Robert Bork,31 Justice Scalia,' and
Michael McConnell,38 (what Cass Sunstein describes as "hard
originalism" 39 ), but to many others as well, including the "soft
originalism" Sunstein sometimes espouses' (and which I believe characterizes the republican revival), Lawrence Lessig's (and sometimes
Sunstein's) "translation,"41 Ahkil Amar's "Neo-Federalism,"4 2 and
Bruce Ackerman's "Neo-Federalism," or "synthesis" of "constitu33. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale LI. 1725, 1812
(1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch]. Originalism looks one
way if compared with textualism, another if opposed to nonoriginalism. To quote
Kenneth Burke, such words are:
"titular".... Titles like "Elizabethanism" or "capitalism" can have no positive referent, for instance. And though they sum up a vast complexity of
conditions which might conceivably be reduced to a near-infinity of positive
details, if you succeeded in such a description you would find that your recipe contained many ingredients not peculiar to "elizabethanism" or "capitalism" at all. In fact, you would find that "Elizabethanism" looked different, if
matched against, say, "medievalism," than if matched against "Victorianism." And "capitalism" would look different if compared and contrasted
with "feudalism" than if dialectically pared with "socialism." Hence terms of
this sort are often called "polar."
Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 184 (1950).
34. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 33, at 1813.
35. See, e.g., Edwin Meese Ill, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L Rev.
22 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction
of Law (1990).
37. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalisn: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849
(1989).
38. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65
Fordhiam L. Rev. 1269 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Originalismand the Desegregation Decisions,81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalismand the
DesegregationDecisions].
39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 173-75 (1996)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Reasoning]; Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 311, 312-13 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Five Theses].
40. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 39, at 173-75; Sunstein, Five
Theses, supra note 39, at 313.
41. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
42. See, eg., Ahkil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed. Constitutional
Amendment OutsideArticle V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994); Ahkil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited- Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L Rev.
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tional moments."43 The Reagan Administration explicitly described
its particular brand of originalism as an effort to enshrine judicial restraint, roll back the jurisprudence of the Warren Court (even though
this aspect of its mission would not entail judicial restraint), place judicial review in the service of democracy, and honor the intentions of
the Founders."
The originalist offensive and effort to drag "external" and "objective" historical facts into law and constitutional theory seemed ridiculous to historians, 5 who could easily show that originalism was
indeterminate, 46 anachronistic,47 not the original understanding,48 and
risked enslaving the present to the dead hand of the past.49 Peter
Onuf recalled that historians spent the Bicentennial "defending 'history' against alien disciplines," 5 most notably the proponents of
originalism. "As custodians of the documentary record, historians
found themselves compelled to demonstrate that the founders' original intentions rarely could be definitely established, and certainly not
on questions the founders did not even consider." 5' For historians,
Reaganite originalism represented an unnecessary detour. They protested "that the cottage industry of original intent scholarship and
analysis" simply diverted scholars' attention "from exploring the history of the Founding Period on its own terms. '5 2 The Reagan Administration's originalism seemed an especially bad example of the "law
office history" historians had long gotten their kicks out of disparaging, 53 "inept and perverted" research aimed at adorning work with
1043 (1988); Ahkil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425
(1987).
43. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding,62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 475 (1995).
44. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 132-39.
45. See Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the
American Historical Profession 598 (1988) ("Perhaps the most striking feature of the
way in which historians signaled their abandonment of traditional objectivist axioms
[in the mind-1980s] was the casual, matter-of-fact fashion in which they did so; the
sometimes condescending attitude they adopted toward those who clung to what they
regarded as outworn shibboleths.").
46. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1986).
47. See Leonard W. Levy, Constitutional Opinions: Aspects of the Bill of Rights
232 (1986).
48. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of
the Constitution 339-65 (1996) [hereinafter Rakove, Original Meanings]; H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 948

(1985).

49. See Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 48, at xv.
50. Peter S. Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiographyin
Bicentennial Perspective, 46 Win. & Mary Q. 341, 342-43 (1989).
51. Id.at 343.
52. Richard B. Bernstein, Chartingthe Bicentennial,87 Colum. L. Rev. 1565, 1604
(1987).
53. See Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev.
119, 122-23 (1965).
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"the trappings of scholarship and seeming roots in the past .... "5
One historian entitled his sarcastic assessment
of the Reaganite
5
originalism, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison.
While historians were mocking Meese, however, most law professors treated originalism far more seriously than they had its two previous incarnations. 56 They recognized it gave the appearance of
avoiding the alternative, which, given the vicissitudes of legal liberalism,' the Reagan Administration successfully intimated, was undisciplined judicial subjectivity. As Mark Tushnet said:
Meese's speeches strike a chord in our understanding of the Constitution, because they direct attention to our fear that judges, like
other government officials, can do us serious harm. The dilemma is
that Justice Brennan's confident liberalism, though it recognizes
that governments and judges 5can
8 do good, fails to express our concern that they do evil as well.
Most law professors considered originalism too valuable to surrender
to Meese and Company. Recognizing the value of preserving it as a
form of constitutional adjudication, they wanted to hang onto it in
some form. After all, the "dominant tradition of constitutional discourse"5 9 had emphasized "static originalism,"' 0 rather than a "historically changing constitution." 61 Consequently, most of originalism's
most vehement critics still felt obligated "to tether their arguments to
some form or original intent."'
II.

LAW PROFESSORS, HISTORIANS, AND THE
REPUBLICAN REVrVAL

Seeming to seize upon Sandel's revival of virtue, community, and
republicanism, some legal liberals therefore eagerly bolstered Sandel's
vision with history to respond to the challenges posed by Reaganites.
54. Charles A. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History 6 (1969).
55. Jack N. Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 1986,
at 77.
56. Compare the legal community's dismissive reaction to 3 William Winslow
Crosskey & William Jeffrey, Jr., Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States: The Political Background of the Federal Convention (1980), and Raoul
Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977), with its reaction to the original intent discussion of Meese and others. See
also Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 72-77, 259-60 n.39.
57. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 88-131.
58. Mark Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers,36 Buff. L
Rev. 217, 218 (1987).
59. Morton Horwitz, The Supreme Cour, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism,107 Harv. L. Rev. 30,
40 (1992).
60. IL at 44.
61. IL at 51.
62. Frederick Schauer, An Essay on ConstitutionalLanguage, in Interpreting Law
and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 133, 138 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
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Why concede the historical background to the right? It seemed only
practical to root republicanism in history by proving that the Founders
revered republicanism. By this storyline, the republican revival
among academic lawyers reflected not only civic longings and anxiety
about legal liberalism, but a strategic move to steal the thunder of
conservative originalists.
Two historians were especially important in the law professors' republican revival-Gordon Wood and J.G.A. Pocock. With the publication of Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American
64
Revolution 63 in 1967, Wood's Creation of the American Republic
("Creation") in 1969, and Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment65 in
1975, historians became "obsessed with forever ridding the college curriculum of the baleful influence of Louis Hartz."'66 In place of Hartz's
theory of an America born free, rich, and modern, which he used to
explain American exceptionalism-where a Lockian liberalism based
on the values of individualism, self-interest, pluralism, and natural
rights had always been dominant 67-historians now detected the language of republican virtue everywhere in eighteenth-century America.
Unlike Hartz, for example, Wood found in Creation that "[t]he sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole formed the
essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic goal of their Revolution."''6 Like Hartz, however, Wood emphasized the triumph of liberalism in 1787, describing the Constitution
as
69
Enlightenment.
American
the
of
finale
the
and
climax
"the
Although it shared Wood's focus on republicanism, Pocock's contribution, The Machiavellian Moment, told a different story. The
Revolution and the Constitution did not represent an effort to transform America into a liberal, capitalistic democracy. Rather, they constituted "the last act of the Civic Renaissance."70 Pocock explored the
normative vocabulary and vision behind the republican paradigm.
Where Wood read "virtue" as "self-denial," Pocock interpreted "vir63. Bernard Bailyn, The Idealogical Origins of the American Revolution (1967);

see also Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination
280 (1992) ("With the publication of Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution, the study of the American Revolution was itself revolutionalized, although curiously the word republicanism does not figure prominently in his
text.").
64. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969)
[hereinafter Wood, Creation] (linking the ideology Bailyn placed at the core of the
Revolution to a one-word bundle-"republicanism," id. at 48).
65. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and

the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975).
66. Isaac Kramnick, The "Great NationalDiscussion". The Discourseof Politicsin
1787, 45 Win. & Mary Q. 3, 4 (1988).

67. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
American Political Thought Since the Revolution 9-11 (1955).
68. Wood, Creation, supra note 64, at 53.
69. Id. at 606.
70. Pocock, supra note 65, at 462.
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tue" as something more positive: "public self-activity," or throwing
oneself "into citizenship, patriotism and civic life."71 Unlike liberalism, which focused on rights, self-interest, and constraints on government, Pocock's republicanism bespoke commitment to common
interest, civic virtue and civic humanism, community values, responsibility, deliberative democracy, and self-determination.
At a time when liberalism seemed "expendable,"' Pocock was suggesting that America possessed a home-grown alternative to the liberal tradition. If he was correct, Americans might not be as
"inevitably individualistic and capitalistic" as Hartz had suggested. 3
Such implications became even more important when Pocock maintained that republicanism might have survived into the present.74
Law professors left-of-center adored Pocock. They made him the
Rawls of the 1980s. He had suggested that republicanism still lived,
and they interpreted him to have imbued the republican synthesis
with a "prescriptive authority."' 5 The Machiavellian Moment has
been cited in nearly 200 law review articles. 76 Because many left-liberal law professors focused on the normative language and vision of
republicanism, they were as taken with republicanism as they were
with Pocock.
The most prominent left-liberal academic lawyer first to harness the
new historical scholarship to originalism was Bruce Ackerman. His
1983 Storrs Lectures, published in 1984, acknowledged his debt to
Wood,' and he would soon be jousting with both Hartz and Pocock.78
Indeed, Ackerman's "Neo-Federalism," or "synthesis," has always
subscribed to some basic premises of the republican revival by intimating that at certain "constitutional moments"-though not as frequently as other republican revivalists indicate-a deliberative and
engaged citizenry can recast the Constitution outside
the cumbersome
79
amendment procedure spelled out in Article V.
Yet Cass Sunstein is more frequently credited with igniting the
blaze of the republican revival in the legal academy. His essay, Inter71. See Daniel J. Rodgers, Republicanism. The Career of a Concept, 79 J. Am.

lest. 11, 19 (1992).

72. Gordon S. Wood, Hellfire Politics,N.Y. Rev. of Books, Feb. 28, 1985, at 29,29.
73. ld.

74. Pocock, supra note 65, at 543-45.
75. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claim of Community, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 685, 690 & n.14 (1992).
76. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 154. This does not necessarily
mean anything.
77. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
Yale LJ. 1013, 1060 n.82 (1984).
78. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 Yale
LJ. 453, 478-86 (1989).
79. Id.at 490, 515.
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est Groups in American Public Law,80 appeared in 1985, the same year
the Reagan Administration began promoting originalism and Richard
Epstein painted the Founders as Hartzian liberals and acquisitive
Lockeans in Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.8 ' Sunstein declared that "the purpose of this article is to help
revive aspects of an attractive conception of government-we may
call it republican-to point out its often neglected but nonetheless
prominent place in the thought of the framers, and to suggest its availability as a foundation from whichjudges and others might evaluate
political processes and outcomes." As he noted, "[t]he republican
understanding
is in the midst of a general revival in various
disciplines. 8 3
80. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups].
81. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985).
82. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 80, at 30-31.
83. Id. at 30 n.7. Certainly the ideas Sunstein expressed were "in the air" in the
law schools for some time and had already begun to be articulated by those on the
left, such as Gerald Frug, see infra. Sunstein, however, was probably the first legal
liberal really to place those ideas in the historical context of the Founding, although
he himself credited two previous articles as preceding his own in the republican revival: Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality
Review?, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 487 (1979), and Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a
LiberalState: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 Yale U. 1537 (1983). Stewart's
article, however, that asserted the compatibility of liberalism with the modem regulatory state did briefly place liberalism in its historical context, see id. at 1543-46, but
paid little attention to either the Founding or the republican tradition (though it did,
in passing, argue that "civic virtue" was an ingredient of a "more ample" liberalism,
id. at 1568-69). Frug's response, Why Neutrality?, 92 Yale L.J. 1591 (1983) [hereinafter Frug, Why Neutrality?], continued the work Frug had begun in The City as Legal
Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980), by borrowing on Pocock to excavate the republican tradition and appropriate it for the left, while arguing that Stewart "is more of
an Eisenhower Republican than he is a classical republican." Frug, Why Neutrality?,
supra, at 1596, 1598. Similarly, Michelman's published work did not yet explicitly pay
much attention to the Founders or to the interplay between republicanism and liberalism. It might be said, however, that Michelman's approach to law, generally, has
long been a binary one in which two visions of government-corresponding roughly
to the public choice and public interest models, or more recently described by him as
"liberalism" and "republicanism"-compete with each other through two judicial
models. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 443 (1989); Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 Yale U. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic]; Frank I.
Michelman, Possession vs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Property,72 Iowa
L. Rev. 1319 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces
of Self-Government]; Frank I. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community Self-Determination: Competing JudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. U.
145 (1977-78).
Among those I identify in the book whose scholarship has been influenced by the
republican revival and has affected the way the legal academy understands the republican revival aside from Ackerman, Sunstein, and Michelman, are Ahkil Amar, Owen
Fiss, Sanford Levinson, Suzanna Sherry, and, for a time, Gregory Alexander, Morton
Horwitz, and Mark Tushnet. I would add Frug and Richard Parker to this group. In
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Claiming that "[r]epublican thought played a central role in the
framing period,"' ' Sunstein painted a picture of Madison boiling up a
republican stew, to which he had added a pinch of pluralism. For example, in Sunstein's hands, Federalist10 s no longer enshrined interest-group pluralism. Rather, it indicated the potential of the large
republic to obtain public-spirited representatives who possessed the
virtue associated with republican citizens. In Sunstein's original
model, a nonrepublican Supreme Court ensured that a republican legislature made government a force of public good.8
Ironically, though Michelman proved more cautious where republicanism was concerned, his 1986 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled Traces of Self-Government,87 became another flash point in
sparking the republican revival. In addressing "[t]he problematic relationship between the two American constitutionalist premises-the
government of the people by the people and the government of the
people by laws,"8 Michelman had long relied upon political theory.
Now he raised the prospect of popular sovereignty and the possibility
of viewing the judiciary as agent of the people. Michelman drew back,
however, declaring that "[i]n the final analysis, the People vanish, abstracted into a story written by none of us."' 9 Instead he turned to
Pocock, a political theorist as well as historian, for assistance with the
question: "In what sense is the United States Constitution, as construed, a charter of self-government?"' 9
addition to the works by Frug, supra, see generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L.Rev. 1276 (1984); Richard Davies Parker,
"Here, the People Rule:" A Constitutional Populist Manifesto (1994); Richard Davies
Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 223
(1981). In the early 1980s, Parker was integrating historians' and political theorists'
work on the republican tradition and its relationship to liberalism in his constitutional
law classes at Harvard. I am grateful to James Fleming for providing me with syllabi
(on file with the Fordham Law Review).
84. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1540
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival].
85. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
86. In time, Sunstein made it clear that he was opposed to the "court-centeredness" of American constitutional theory. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 9 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Partial Constitution]; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Supreme Cour4 1995 Term-Foreword. Leaving Things Undecided, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8-9 & n.8 (1996) (claiming that his "treatment is more skeptical of
judges and less so of majoritarian institutions" than either Michelman's or Bickel's).
Sunstein, who rightly observes that the legal academy is still under "the spell cast by
the Warren Court," has apparently fallen under the spell of Gerald Rosenberg. See
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 39, at 59-60, 176-77; Cass R. Sunstein, Earl
Warren is Dead,The New Republic, May 13, 1996, at 35 (reviewing Ronald Dworkin,
Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1996) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Freedom's Law]).
87. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 83.
88. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 83, at 1500-01.
89. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 83, at 65.
90. hd at 55.
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Surveying America's history through the Founding, Michelman portrayed republicanism as a "counter-ideology" to liberal pluralism. A
partner in a dialectic, republicanism figured "less as canon than ethos,
less as blueprint than as conceptual grid, less as settled institutional
fact than as semantic field for normative debate and constructive imagination."'" Drawing upon Pocock's vision of republicanism as the
version the colonists had carried with them across the Atlantic,
Michelman implied that Wood might be correct to state that liberalism
had triumphed in 1787. But what did that matter? To Michelman,
originalism was a form of "authoritarianism," a "looking backward jurisprudence," which regarded "adjudicative actions as legitimate only
insofar as dictated by the prior normative utterance, express or implied, of extra-judicial authority."' He believed ideas had to stand on
their own bottoms, and he tweaked Sunstein and Ackerman for trying
to root the Constitution in the republican tradition.9 3
Nevertheless, Michelman acknowledged, "the republican tradition
of civic dialogue retains a strong, if somewhat disguised and twisted,
hold on American constitutional imagination."'94 He also strongly implied that, as long as the alternative was liberal pluralism, survival was
a good thing. Republicanism responded to "the demand, said to be
sweeping across the various fields of thought, for recovery of practical
knowledge, situated judgment, dialogue, and civic friendship." 95 By
offering "historical validation for the ideal of freedom as self-government realized through politics, along with visionary resources for critical comprehension of the ideal, '9 6 it could help transform the
Constitution into "a charter of self-government."
"[W]here, if anywhere, can we find self government inside the Constitution?"9 8 Michelman then asked. Unlike Sunstein, who rooted republicanism in the legislature, Michelman featured a republican
Supreme Court acting as the functional equivalent of the ancient
Greek city-state, in which nine citizens without pre-political ends deliberatively and dialogically considered the public good and guaranteed that the nonrepublican legislature pursued it. According to
Micheiman, the Supreme Court was responsible for "the modeling of
active self-government that citizens find practically beyond reach.
Unable as a nation to practice our own self-government..., [we can]
91. Id at 17.
92. Michelman, Laws Republic, supra note 83, at 1496.
93. See id. at 1522-23; Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 83, at 1920, 58-66.
94. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 83, at 23.
95. Id at 24-25.
96. Id. at 74.
97. Id at 55.
98. Id at 56.
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identify with the judiciary's [modeling of active self-government]."' 9
Judicial review provided "traces of self-government."
Maybe the traces were not large. Michelman expressed fear of a
"pathology of court-fetishism" even as he admitted he might be subscribing to it.1°° Read one way, he seemed to say "yes, the Court does
provide America's last traces of self-government, and isn't that sad?"
Read another, however, he seemed to displace the countermajoritarian difficulty, as he stressed "more optimistic possibilities in
the idea of the Court as a bastion of (its own) self-government." 10 1
After all, he subsequently maintained, "[j]udges perhaps enjoy a situational advantage over the people at large in listening for voices from
the margins."1 0 2

Both Sunstein's and Michelman's versions presented republicanism
as a methodological and conceptual breakthrough. Both species of
republicanism tried to sidestep the counter-majoritarian difficulty, offering the Court an activist and positive role as guarantor of democracy. Erwin Chemerinsky attributed republicanism's glamour
partially to the fact that it avoided "viewing American democracy as
primarily based on majority rule and ... justifie[d] judicial value
choices based on its concept of 'civic virtue."" 0 3 Republicanism also
deflected attention from the intellectual incoherence some thought
had characterized the Warren Court's legal liberalism, because
Michelman and Sunstein viewed republicanism as an effort to steer
between foundationalism and irrationalism. It would take them "beyond objectivism and relativism."'' 1 In short, republicanism held out
a past and prospective deliberation, dialogue, and consensus, while offering 0the
hope of a public interest and common good that law could
5
serve.1

Further, republicanism enabled those law professors "haunted by
the ghost of Earl Warren"
to go beyond his court's liberalism. 10e As a
"communitarian virus' 0 7 swept constitutional theory, law professors
used republicanism to develop theories of community that would
"overcome the divide between the one and the many, the individual
99. Id at 74.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 83, at 1537.
103. Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution,supra note 8, at 99.
104. Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis 2 (1983) (heralding the emergence of a new conversation about human
rationality).
105. See Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 83, at 24-28; Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 84, at 1541, 1548-51, 1566-69.
106. Linda Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 983, 985 (1990).

107. Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History- Self Government in American Constitutional Theory 2 (1992).
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and the majority.' ' 10 8 Instead of thinking in terms of individual rights
versus the majority and government, as Warren Court liberals had
done, republicanism enabled law professors to understand self-interest and government as interconnected: Citizens could maximize selfinterest only through participation in civic life and the display of civic
virtue. In the meantime, republicanism would do as much as liberalism to protect individual rights. Consequently, the 1980s witnessed a
"spate of articles" urging the reconstruction of various fields of law
and judicial decisions "in light of the lessons of republicanism."' 1 9
Law professors marketed republicanism as a theory which could solve
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, avoid incoherence and achieve
principle in decision-making, provide progressives with even more
than they had received from the Warren Court, and possessed the
Founders' imprimatur.
This was a more benign republicanism than historians were finding
at work in America's history. To be sure, some historians, such as
Lance Banning, seemed attracted to the communitarian impulse and
the air-brushed Madison they placed at the core of republicanism." 0
Most, however, had their hands full worrying about matters such as
the sources and evolution of republican ideology and the various contemporary meanings attached to it. Historians described the authoritarianism of republicanism, its militarism, its elitism, its emphasis on
patriarchy, and its concern with past and "country," as opposed to
economic development."' In the process, they developed an appreciation for the complexity of republicanism and became fond of quoting
John Adams's observation that "[t]here is not a single more2 unintelligible word in the English language than republicanism."
Historians viewed the republican revival in constitutional theory
with bemusement. On the surface, this was no "history lite.""' 3 Mr.
Sunstein had met not only Mr. Madison, but Messrs. Bailyn, Wood,
and Pocock as well. Indeed, law professors, who had ignored the work
108. Id. at 171.
109. William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory
and the JudicialInterpretationof the Bill of Rights, in A Culture of Rights: The Bill of
Rights in Philosophy, Politics, and Law-1791 and 1991, at 266, 311 (Michael J. Lacey
& Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991) [hereinafter Culture of Rights].
110. See Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the
Founding of the Federal Republic 9-10, 77, 368 (1995) [hereinafter Banning, Sacred
Fire]; Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology 13
(1978).
111. For an overview of historical scholarship, see the excellent essay by Rodgers,
supra note 71.
112. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 Yale L.J. 1663, 1663 (1988)
(quoting Adams in her comment on Sunstein and Michelman).
113. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 523, 529 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty, History "Lite"] (exploring
"the histiography of early American constitutionalism to suggest the insights that
have yet to emerge fully from a serious engagement with America's own formative
constitutional experience").
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of historians as important as Charles Beard and Richard Hofstadter,
were suddenly falling upon Pocock and Wood. They were, as one historian they cited acknowledged, doing their "homework" by immersing themselves in historical scholarship on the Founding and treating
it with almost the same reverence as they had traditionally reserved
for eighteenth-century sources," 4 such as The Federalist.But to what
end? Historians wondered why lawyers would offer a rosy picture of
republicanism in the past to justify an argument for reviving republicanism in the present.
Soon the historians and law professors were going head to head. At
a packed 1987 session of the Association of American Law Schools,
designed to present the work of "the legal avant garde," Sunstein and
15
Michelman, historian Joyce Appleby commented upon their work.
Reconstructing the event for me, one law professor recalled Appleby
stating: "'Fellas, if you find late-eighteenth-century republicanism a
useful source, OK, but don't be so ahistorical as to identify the republicans' views with yours."' 6 When I listened to the tape, I found that
Appleby had more tactfully told the lawyers that, for all their immersion in historians' work, they were not behaving like historians."' In
other words, the law professors' concentration on the texts of the
Founding reflected their search for continuity between past and present and their attempt to imbue the past with prescriptive authority.
Seeking to understand the Founding's context and explain change
over time, however, historians, such as Appleby, focused on the differentness and irretrievability of the Founders' world and found the argument that we should "take a position" on, or "support"
republicanism bizarre." 8
Responding to Appleby, Michelman took the offensive: "'Without
the past,... who am I?,' he asked. 'Who are we? ...Without a sense
of our identity, how do we begin to make a case for anything? Without mining the past, where do we go for inspiration?""'19 The key
words here were "mining" and "make a case," for that was what law
professors were doing when they used history to revive republicanism:
They mined the past for the purpose of finding arguments that would
enable them to make a case for the social order they wanted in the
present. Thus, Sunstein forthrightly told Appleby what he repeated in
the Yale Law Journal: "[T]he presence of a historical pedigree [at the
Founding] ...adds force to the case for a republican revival." 2 0
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Conversation with Joyce Appleby, Professor of History, UCLA (May, 1992).
See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 175.
Id.
Id.
Kerber, supra note 112, at 1664.
Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 175.
Id.; see also Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 84, at 1564.
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GOOD NEWS, BAD NEws

The "historical pedigree" is of dubious value. Like some genealogists in search of a bloodline in which they can take pride, Sunstein
and Michelman have burnished their ancestors. In their more recent
writings, Sunstein and Michelman suggest that they are shearing republicanism of some of the attributes that were objectionable about it
in the past, such as patriarchy, authoritarianism, and militarism. It
goes by the name of "liberal republicanism,''
"republicanism of
rights,"' 2 "deliberative democracy,"'" or "soft originalism" supple' 24
mented by either "Madisonian considerations" or "republicanism.'
It is, in short, neo-republicanism, and it includes some of liberalism's
more attractive aspects, such as an emphasis on rights. In a sense, this
is progress. 25 It reflects the growing sense of historians that "liberalism" and "republicanism" did not stand in sharp opposition to each
other at1 26the Founding and that the debate between them is
,,sterile."'
Yet, this leaves a stylized and romantic republicanism more likely to
appeal to political theorists than historians (bringing us back to
Sandel), and reflects what one legal historian has called legal scholars'
"utopian use of republicanism"-that is, their reliance on it to propose "reforms of particular doctrinal regimes."'1 27 To be sure, most
121. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 86, at 134; Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, supra note 84, at 1566.
122. See Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism, Rights: A Comment on Pangle, 66 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 177, 179 (1990).
123. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 86, at 133-34; see also James
Kloppenberg, DeliberativeDemocracy and JudicialSupremacy, 13 L. & Hist. Rev. 393
(1995) (reviewing Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 86).
124. See Sunstein, Five Theses, supra note 39, at 314.
125. See Flaherty, History "Lite," supra note 113, at 576.
126. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 174; see also Banning, Sacred
Fire,supra note 110, at 428 n.3 (arguing that "nearly all Americans were both 'republicans' and 'liberals' ... and did not see the sort of clash between these two distinguishable bodies of ideas that has been posited by many modem scholars"); Robert E.
Shallhope, Jefferson and Madison-Again, 24 Revs. in Am. Hist. 401, 406 (1996) (advocating the move "beyond the sterile contest between scholars touting either republicanism or liberalism to a far more sophisticated understanding of the [Founding]").
As Martin Flaherty explains:
Contrary to H. Jefferson Powell, the difficulty is not that Sunstein advances a
'hybrid' liberal/republican Founding that cannot 'serve as a corrective to
concepts that it already embodied,' such as interest-group pluralism, which
Sunstein would like to correct. Rather, the problem is that Sunstein speaks
of a historical 'hybrid,' but talks only about its deliberative democratic aspects when he considers governmental institutions and the ideas underlying
them.
Flaherty, History "Lite," supra note 113, at 576 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving
Republicanism, 97 Yale L.J. 1703, 1707 (1988)).
127. Fisher, supra note 109, at 312 n.154. There has been little or no attempt to
examine the influence republicanism actually has had in the last ten to fifteen years on
law and doctrine. What, if any, impact have scholarly proposals had on judicial opinions and legal doctrine? This would be a wonderful project for someone, but I am not
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"isms" possess unattractive characteristics and may prove valuable if

reconstructed without them. For historians, however, lopping off patriarchy, which was central to eighteenth-century republican thought,

from republicanism as a contemporary normative vision, makes no
more sense than advocating the liberalism of Lyndon Johnson without

acknowledging its past relationship to the war in Vietnam. Historian
Linda Kerber has used the pages of the Yale Law Journal to ridicule
Michelman's effort to develop an "inclusory republicanism:"
"Michelman seeks to cleanse 'We the People' of the ironies of classical
republicanism..., defuse it of its antique association with arms and

violence, and offer an American republicanism constructed by the
Many, not the Few."'1

8

Thus, the neo-republicans' account of the Founding may not
strengthen law professors' case for neo-republicanism, or a republican
revival. In Kerber's words: "It is anachronistic and unnecessary to
reach back over the last two hundred years to claim the republicanism
of the early modem era. 12 9 For her, the existence of republicanism in
the early republic does not make the case for the adoption of republicanism today more persuasive. Like many of legal theorists' attempts
to rely on the past, this effort to root the present in the past also ignores what has happened between past and present. In fact, left-libsure there are any takers. In writing Strange Career,supra note 7, I was disappointed
to find that so many of the people involved in inaugurating the republican revival in
the mid-1980s seemed to have lost much of their initial excitement about it because I
thought Strange Career might have been more interesting if the republican revival
possessed ardent defenders. (Now that is liberal and self-interested reasoning!) But
instead, the republican revival, though still alive, seemed to be flickering. Perhaps
neo-republicanism has been absorbed, or will ultimately be absorbed into pragmatism. More generally, I am not certain how far such a project would take us because I
do not know how seriously to take the language of legal doctrine as it appears in
judicial opinions. Did a judge write it? Did a clerk, who took a course from
Michelman or Sunstein? Undoubtedly, my skepticism about judicial opinions grows
out of the jaundiced attitude I developed from writing a biography of Abe Fortas,
who did not take opinion-writing very seriously and who once instructed a clerk to
"decorate" an opinion with the appropriate legalese. To me, that did not mean that
having read the parties' briefs, Fortas knew the law was there, but that he did not care
what the law said. See Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography 271-72 (1990). The
question of the republican revival's influence on opinions is part and doctrine is parcel
of a larger question being debated in the legal world today: How can we evaluate the
impact of legal scholarship on opinions and doctrine? See Kalman, Strange Career,
supra note 7, at 239-44; see also Steven Calabresi, The Crisis in ConstitutionalTheory,
83 Va. L. Rev. 247, 264-67 (1997) (questioning the relevance of constitutional theory
in his review of Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief
(1996)). It seems obvious to me that I am not the person to answer such questions,
though it will be equally obvious to readers that I do not go as far as Pierre Schlag in
questioning the impact of normative and doctrinal work on legal and judicial practice.
See Pierre Schlag, Laying Down the Law- Mysticism, Fetishism, and the American
Legal Nind 28-29, 170 n.10 (1996). If I did, I would not be interested in the possibility
of a "credible originalism."
128. Kerber, supra note 112, at 1667-68.
129. I. at 1672 (emphasis added).
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eral law professors, who have focused on the civic republicanism of
the Founding, might find the labor republicanism of the nineteenth
century more progressive and appealing.130 Further, the neo-republican account of the Founding risks reducing liberalism to a static concept and ignoring the historical significance of its own odyssey and
continual reconfiguration. 131 As Kerber says, "[i]t was not the civic
humanists to whom women, blacks, Jews, and the marginalized groups
of modem times have been able to turn for solutions.' 32 Indeed,
neo-republicanism borrows from and builds on modem liberalism to
such an extent that it has been described as republicanism for
Rawls, 3 3 and, in Sunstein's case, as republicanism for John Hart
Ely."3 In fact, at places in Strange Career,351 suggested neo-republicanism was36 simply a new name for legal liberalism and Rawlsian
liberalism.

That helps explain historians' critical response to law professors'
neo-republicanism. Superficially, a hypothetical historian might say,
the historiography of law professors' republican revival seemed different from traditional "law office history." The law professors who enlisted in the republican revival seemed to be taking the work of
historians seriously. Even more significantly, they were differentiating
between historians, rather than utilizing them as the supplier of fac130. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 71, at 23-30. See generally Sean Wilentz, Chants
Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850
(1984).
131. See Dorothy Ross, Liberalism, in A Companion to American Thought 397
(Richard W. Fox and James T. Kloppenberg eds., 1995).
132. Kerber, supra note 112, at 1672.
133. See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political
Ideology, 1991 Duke L.J. 561, 594; Lawrence G. Sager, The IncorrigibleConstitution,
65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 923 (1990). According to James Pope:
In this process-enhancing role, the Court facilitates rather than displaces or
represents popular participation ....Unfortunately, this insight yields little
in the way of prescription that Michelman had not already taught us long
before his journey in Pocock ...when he argued that the Constitution compels government to provide a 'social minimum' of resources to every person
so that he or she can function as a full participant in the political life of the
community.
James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of DirectPopularPower in the American ConstitutionalOrder, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 287, 302 (1991) (citing Frank Michelman's
HarvardLaw Review Foreword, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 83, drawing on
Rawlsian theory). Some critics, originally attracted to neo-republicanism because of
its potential to help bring about progressive politics, have expressed sadness over constitutional theorists' use of it to bolster what the critics see as the tired agenda of
political liberals. See Gregory S. Alexander, "FragmentedSurvival": Republicanism
as Rhetoric, CLS: Newsletter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, November,
1989, at 76, 76.
134. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L.
Rev. 211, 280 (1993). Ely, however, has little use for the republican revival. See John
Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: ConstitutionalTheory and Practicein a World Where
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures,77 Va. L. Rev. 833, 840 n.15 (1991).
135. Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7.
136. See id. at 8, 163.
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toids to be plugged into legal arguments. But they were turning the
historians themselves into factoids-talking heads who bolstered the
law professors' case for continuity. The law professors who embraced
the republican revival were assuming the same attitude toward historians' work that a prior generation of academic lawyers took toward
other disciplines.137 The republican revivalists appropriated historians
for advocacy purposes, permitting the present to overwhelm the past.
The more "law office history" has changed, the more it has stayed the
same.
That, I argue, is the good news. Historians may dismiss the legal
community's effort to reach back to the Founders as ahistorical. Yet
because law professors, judges, and lawyers value the "historical pedigree" so much more than historians do, they will continue to search
for it and treat the past as legitimating. The existence of such a pedigree means that a theory for the present can be presented as valuable
simply "because 'the framers' thought it was valuable."13 That
means, as Gordon Wood has said, that the "stakes ... are very highthey are nothing less than the kind of society that we have been, or
ought to become."'' 1 9 Historians must recognize, to quote Wood
again, that the legal community treats original intent as a "necessary
Further, though Richard Posner has mocked originalfiction."'"
ism,141 conservatives such as Bernard Siegan and Robert Bork celebrate it.142
Thus, if Sunstein advances a historical pedigree for the constitutional order he advocates, he meets originalism on its own terms and
attaches it to a progressive agenda. As he observes, although "there is
a freestanding, nonhistorical argument for deliberative democracy as a
central political ideal," constitutional lawyers' argument in its favor
"draws substantial support from historical understandings.' 43 He
and other "liberal republicans" in contemporary constitutional theory
137. See John Hart Ely's satirical description of judicial opinions which would draw
on philosophy: "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated."
Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 26, at 58; see also Charles W. Collier, The
Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship,41 Duke L.J. 191, 219-20 (1991).
138. See Mark Thshnet, The Concept of Tradition in ConstitutionalHistoriography,

29 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 93, 96 (1987) [hereinafter Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition].
139. See Gordon S. Wood, The Virtues and the Interests,The New Republic, February 11, 1991, at 32, 32 (book review).
140. Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 Vrn. &
Mary Q. 628, 632-33 (1987).
141. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 229-55 (1995).
142. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of

Law (1990); Bernard Siegan, The Supreme Court's Constitution: An Inquiry into Judicial Review and Its Impact on Society (1987). Though the case of Richard Epstein is
more complicated, I would also include him among the originalists. See Kalman,
Strange Career, supra note 7, at 134-35 & 312-13 n.7.
143. Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Usable Past, 95 Colum. I Rev. 601, 606 (1995)

[hereinafter Sunstein, A Usable Past].
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make their arguments for the present much more powerful for the
legal community by allying themselves with the winners at the constitutional convention, and by suggesting that it is they, the "modern
republicans," who are carrying out the Founders' intent.
The bad news is the appeal to the republican tradition may not take
them where they want to go. The neo-republicans have argued that
their jurisprudence can do as much as a jurisprudence of rights.
Michelman has maintained that Bowers v. Hardwick' could have
been decided differently had the Supreme Court made use of a jurisprudence of neo-republicanism, which would have required the Court
to protect all forms of consensual sex, including sodomy. 14 5 In a tour
de force, he has even made privacy democratic.' 46 But to me (and I
am hardly alone), 47 it seems highly possible that the result in Bowers
is the sort we would have to fear under a republican revival. It may be
that neo-republicans, vulnerable to the lure of community and an engaged citizenry as the old consensus about legal scholarship breaks
down and Earl Warren's ghost dims, have idealized the notions of
community and citizenship and overvalued them at the expense of individual rights.
My concern here is different from that expressed earlier. It is not
that the neo-republicans are rechristening tired political/legal/philosophical liberalism with a trendy new name. It is that neo-republicanism could be used to justify non-liberal politics.
By this analysis, the republican revival has been useful insofar as it
has swung attention away from procedural justice, neutrality, and
rights. But it may fit Leo Strauss's vision of America, 4 8 or the vision
advanced by Robert Bork recently in Slouching Towards Gomorrah,'149 his own republican though politically conservative obverse of
Sandel's jeremiad,'5 0 better than it does the vision of left-liberal communitarians, who seek a progressive politics. By this analysis, the re144. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
145. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 83, at 1532-33.
146. IL at 1533-36.
147. For examples, see the sources cited in Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7,
at 209, 345 & n.49.
148. But see J. David Hoeveler, Jr., OriginalIntent and the Politics of Republicanism, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 863, 892-93 (1992) (noting that "conservatives have not seized

on the republican theme for their cause in the way that liberal scholars have").
149. Robert H. Bork, Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modem Liberalism and
American Decline (1996) [hereinafter Bork, Slouching].
150. Whereas Sandel sadly roots the displacement of "the political economy of citizenship" by "the political economy of growth and distributive justice" in "the late
New Deal, and culminating in the early 1960s," Sandel, Democracy's Discontent,
supra note 2, at 250, Bork focuses his ire on the 1960s, Bork, Slouching, supra note
149, at 1-55. I wish I knew what to make of the fact that the villains of both-Thurman Arnold for Sandel and Kingman Brewster for Bork-might be identified as Yale
men.
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publican revival would be fundamentally flawed because it is the
wrong tool to fix what is broken.
That does not mean those left of center should abandon the field of
Founders' intent and originalism. If they do, the conservative
originalists will overrun it with history that is no better from a historian's perspective and dangerous from the perspective of a citizen who
identifies herself as left-liberal. Even Kerber concedes: "It may be
useful to have these [neo-republican] claims [for the contemporary social order] made in the rhetoric of the Founders because, in practice,
theirs are the voices to which we have been trained to listen."'15 1 As
she notes, the alternatives are unappealing. "To ally oneself with
Marxian dissent is to foreclose a hearing by centrist opinion in
America; to1' ally
oneself with the Antifederalists is to be caught on the
52
losing side.'
What, then, should historians do? Do we opt to police our turf
against the law professors, as Kerber has done in the law reviews, or
to join law professors with whom we sympathize, as Kerber has also
done in the courts? I believe one feasible answer is to follow Kerber
in rejecting neo-republicanism for both historical and political reasons
while accepting originalism and working with the legal community to
craft what Michael Doff has sardonically labeled a "kinder, gentler
53
1

originalism."'

151. Kerber, supra note 112, at 1672.
152. Id.
153. Michael Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory:
The Case of OriginalMeaning, 85 Geo. LJ. 1765, 1774 (1997). James Fleming has
identified another possible response for historians and others: turning to history, as
opposed to originalism, "in order to pursue an historically grounded moral reading"
of the Constitution "a la Dworkin." Fleming, Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note
31, at 1345; see also Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 Geo. L J.
1849 (1997) (referring to Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 86). Fleming asks:
"Why not conceive the turn to history as doing 'fit' work in support of a liberal or
progressive moral reading rather than as a broad form of originalism that rejects the
moral reading?" Fleming, Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note 31, at 1345. He
notes:
[T]he answer to the question-Why have the turns to history and to text,
history, and structure become turns to broad originalism and against the
moral reading?-is to be found in considerations of litigation strategy or
judgments about the types of arguments that are appropriate in our constitutional culture. The thought seems to be that our constitutional culture is
largely originalist (or positivist), and therefore that arguments in constitutional law, to be successful, simply must be framed in an originalist mold.
Id. at 1346. Fleming disposes of those arguments to his satisfaction, id. at 1346-48, but
not to mine. I lack his enthusiasm for Dworkinism at this juncture anyway, though
Dworkin has provided us with a very helpful way of understanding one hero of legal
liberalism, Earl Warren. In addition to Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 86, see
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
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RHETORIC OF ORIGINALISM

Constitutional interpretation has traveled a long way since Earl
Warren left the bench. "We, of course, venerate the past, but our focus is on the problems of the day and the future as far as we can
foresee it," Warren declared in his farewell address.15 4 Warren belonged to what Justice Scalia recently described as a "school of constitutional interpretation affirm[ing] the existence of what is called 'the
Living Constitution,' a body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows
and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing
society.1 155 Scalia laments that a jurisprudence of "Living Constitutionalism" is "ascendant"57 today,156 while nonoriginalists bemoan the
triumph of originalism.'
Yet, despite all the efforts of both originalists and nonoriginalists to
present themselves as embattled Davids crusading against Goliaths,
originalism appears comfortably lodged in the legal community. Lawyers, law professors, and judges recognize that originalism serves the
societal need for continuity and a "usable past"-a need at times satisfied by both law and history (and, for some academic lawyers, by the
republican revival in particular). 58 That is why nonoriginalists in the
classroom and at conference tables so frequently turn out to be
originalists in the courtroom. 5 9 That is why in advocating "soft
154. Arthur S. Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in ConstitutionalInterpretation,
6 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487, 499 (1979).
155. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 38
(1997).
156. Id at 38, 44; see also Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 37, at 853
("Those who have not delved into the scholarly writing on constitutional law for several years may be unaware of the explicitness with which many prominent and
respected commentators reject the original meaning of the Constitution as an authoritative guide."); Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an 'Ism', 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y, 301, 301 (1996) ("[A]mong constitutional law scholars at elite schools, the idea
of being an originalist is tantamount to being some sort of intellectual Luddite.").
157. See, e.g, Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalismin the Actual
Performance of Legal Roles, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 495, 495 (1996) ("[A]lmost
everyone is an originalist in at least some limited sense."); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of ParticularConceptions of ConstitutionalInterpretation,77 Va. L. Rev. 669,
687 (1991) ("It seems difficult, in American political-legal culture, to make a persuasive case for nonoriginalism .... That difficulty helps to explain why it is so hard to
locate a real, live nonoriginalist, whether judge or, even, academic theorist."). Just
consider the distance Perry himself has traveled from advising us in the early 1980s
"to let the framers sleep," Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human
Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 75 (1982), to his more recent acceptance of originalism, Michael J. Perry, The
Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 53 (1994).
158. See Sunstein, A Usable Past, supra note 143, at 603-05. For illuminating discussions of how Americans have historically used their collective history, past, and tradition, see Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of
Tradition in American Culture (1991), and Mike Wallace, Mickey Mouse History and
Other Essays on American Memory (1996).
159. See Thomas B. McAffee, Originalismand Indeterminacy, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 429, 432 (1996):
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originalism" as a "valuable project," Sunstein has said it avoids the
"problem with hard originalism- ... that it would result in an unacceptably narrow set of liberties for the United States in the Twentieth
Century" and "is much better for rule of law reasons" than nonoriginalism.' 60 For him, "soft originalism" avoids both "the dead
hand of the past" and "uncabined judicial subjectivity."''
Some constitutional theorists might object that such originalism is
simply an effort to have one's cake and eat it too.16- But given our
recognition of the impossibility of our task-historicizing, or recreating, previous eras as perceived by those who lived through themhistorians are unlikely to join that chorus. Further, though historians
may consider all originalism indeterminate and anachronistic, surely
they find some forms of it less tenable than others.
In fact, because of their familiarity with the sources and command
of the scholarship, historians are well-equipped to help the legal community weed out the most untenable forms of originalism. 163 The task
may seem demoralizing, but it is worthwhile: "Even the most cynical
originalist stands willing to concede a point when a relevant source
cuts directly against her."'16 Indeed, it may even be gratifying. Historians, who generally focus on a limited field or period and reach
tentative conclusions, 65 may marvel at lawyers' breadth and boldness
Just prior to the Persian Gulf War, constitutional law scholars filed an amicus curiae brief in Dellums v. Bush in support of the view that President
Bush could not constitutionally commit American troops to combat in that
war without congressional authorization. If you read this brief, which is
signed by purported critics of originalism, you will find that there is not a
truly nonoriginalist argument in it. (citations omitted).
160. Sunstein, Five Theses, supra note 39, at 312-13.
161. But see Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 So. Cal. L Rev. 381, 394-95 (1997)
(doubting whether soft originalism solves these problems).
162. See id.
163. See Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, supra note 33, at 1748, 1752-53.
164. Id at 1754 n.146 ("This phenomenon may explain why Justice Scalia, for example, is curiously silent in those areas where he has reason to believe that the weight of
historical scholarship is against him."). But see Fleming, Our Imperfect Constitution,
supra note 31, at 1346 ("The attempt to persuade Scalia that fidelity to the Constitution leads to any liberal or progressive conclusions is a fool's errand.").
165. Flaherty cites the example of historian Conrad Russell, "a leading historian of
the English Civil War, telling a fellow student working in that field that the student
would have to memorize the principal events that occurred during each day of the
1650s before he could attempt either his oral examinations or dissertation." Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 33, at 1752 n.140. It sometimes seems that
historians' favorite expression is: "That's not my field (or period)." For example,
Rakove declines to speculate on the original meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments but tentatively aligns himself with Ackerman's interpretation as the one which
seems most feasible to "my untutored eye." See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through
History (Or To It), 65 Fordham L Rev. 1587, 1591 n.9 (1997). Yet surely Rakove, a
historian of the Revolutionary era, knows as much about the Reconstruction as some
of the law professors who have written about it. The norms of what one expects
oneself to know to produce scholarship, however, are different for historians and law
professors. The result is that the scope of historians' work has become increasingly

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

in putting their research to work. Thus, historians should persist in
condemning the "hard originalism" of the right and the "soft originalism" of the left-liberal republican revival. They should recognize,
however, that originalism is too useful as rhetoric to surrender.
I do not use "rhetoric" in the dismissive sense in which it is frequently employed today-as when we speak of "mere rhetoric."
Rather, rhetoric, "the art of persuasive communication,"'166 is essential
to both history and law. J.H. Hexter observed, "[r]hetoric is ordinarily deemed icing on the cake of history, but.., it is mixed right into
the batter."'

67

Similarly, academic lawyers have recently begun to

study how rhetoric pervades the law.' 68 Rhetoric consists of reality
and discourse; rhetoric is about choices, 6 9 even as it is inescapable. 70
The perceived needs of judicial oratory that focuses on the past and
deliberative oratory that concentrates on the future led Aristotle both
to appreciate not only rhetoric but also the place of history in rhetoric.
For Aristotle, rhetoric's greatest publicist and connoisseur of the uses
of history, examples from history were simply that-"examples" or
"paradigms" fitting for rhetorical induction and "a beginning.'1'7 Historical examples and paradigms were valuable for deliberative oratory, aimed at projecting the future: "Although it is easier to provide
illustrations through fables, examples from history are more useful in
deliberation; for generally, future events will be like those of the
past." 7
Unlike some contemporary rhetoricians (and law professors), 173 historians no longer believe the future ordinarily resembles
the past and are currently more interested in difference and change
narrow. See Thomas Bender, Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American
History, 73 J. Am. Hist. 120 (1986); David Thelen, A Roundtable: Synthesis in American History, 74 J. Am. Hist. 107 (1987). Years ago, Carl Degler opened a critical
evaluation of David Riesman's use of history in The Lonely Crowd by observing: "It
seems to be either the fate or the opportunity of historians to be checking on how
others use history. For it is the non-historians who write the broad interpretations of
the American past." Carl Degler, The Sociologist as Historian: Riesman's The Lonely
Crowd, 15 Am. Q. 483, 483 (1963). Historians too often lack the chutzpah.
166. Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric 1 (1988).
167. J.H. Hexter, Historiography: The Rhetoric of History,in 6 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 368, 390 (David Sills ed., 1968); see also Berkhofer,
supra note 5, at 76-105; Ronald H. Carpenter, History as Rhetoric: Style, Narrative,
and Persuasion (1995).
168. See, e.g., Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Peter Brooks and
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
169. See Edward P.J. Corbett, The Open Hand and the Closed Fist, in Selected Essays of Edward P.J. Corbett 99, 108 (Robert J. Connors ed., 1989).
170. See Stanley Fish, Withholding the Missing Portion: Psychoanalysisand Rhetoric, in Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies 525, 552 (1989)
171. Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse 40, 179 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991) [hereinafter Aristotle on Rhetoric].
172. Id at 181.
173. One of the aspects of James A. Berlin's engaging essay, Revisionary Histories
of Rhetoric: Politics, Power, and Plurality, in Writing Histories of Rhetoric 112
(Victor J. Vitanza ed., 1994), I find most interesting is the defiant rhetoric. It suggests
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than in continuity. 7 4 Both historians and lawyers, however, recognize

the value of history to rhetoric.
Indeed, there is something to be said for the use of historical exam-

ples as examples or paradigms by members of the legal community. I
am rarely irritated when I read the normative argument "we should
do it this way," followed by "if you don't believe this, consider the
example of the Founders." The historical example lends authority.
My complaint is that too often the legal community uses history as
enthymeme, which Aristotle thought appropriate for rhetorical syllogism, 175 as in "We should do it this way; for the Founders did it this
way," or "Since/if the Founders did it this way, we should do it this
that revisionist historians of rhetoric are fighting an old battle and they do not realize
that in history, their side has won:
A commonplace of historical studies is that the past is studied in order that
we may not repeat its mistakes, encountering in it lessons of value for the
present. While this formulation cannot be rejected out of hand, it is often
employed in the service of a historical conception that sees the past and
present as identical. For instance, those who see in Cicero's De oratore a
discussion of argument that "serves as a good index to the subsequent history of rhetoric" (Sloan) somehow overlook the obvious differences between
the violently antidemocratic Rome of Cicero and the contemporary commitment to democracy found in most Western states (however much the commitment remains unfulfilled). As I have said repeatedly, the historiographic
method I am suggesting foregrounds difference over identity. This difference, furthermore, is useful not simply because it offers new conceptions of
the past not yet entertained. I am also convinced it offers new interpretations of the present.
Id. at 122.
174. Compare a flat statement by Nicholas Dirks in an essay published in 1996:
"Most historians would agree that history is fundamentally about change," Nicholas
Dirks, Is Vce Versa? HistoricalAnthropologies and AnthropologicalHistories,in The
Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, supra note 5, at 17, 31, with Oscar Handlin's
remark fifty (!) years ago about some colleagues who had written: "In 1944 the
United States is not what it was in 1927," Novick, supra note 45, at 391. Handlin
thought:
[their] whole statement... misleading. While the United States is not now
what it was in 1927 in some respects, in the more important respects it is now
what it was then .... The focal point of history's concerns is continuity, and
continuity implies that elements of sameness persist. Although historians
must call attention to the mutations, they must emphasize the elements of
continuity. And to grant that continuity within change exists leads necessarily to the conclusion that the elements of continuity are the essentials, of
mutation, the incidentals. Can we not then expect the historian, whether of
1927 or of 1944 to select the facts that bear upon the essential rather than
upon the incidentals? The historian may seek to escape the problem by surrender, by concession that all is incidental. But he has a more worthy task.
Working on the hypothesis that there is continuity to the human past, his
primary mission is to define the nature of that continuity and of the media
through which it operates.
Id. at 391-92.
175. See Aristotle on Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 40. Examples can be "used in
making enthymemes and especially in refutation, where one example can refute a
universal positive (e.g., U.S. presidents have not always lived in the White House; for
George Washington never lived in the White House)." Id. at 212 n.259.
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way." The enthymeme here seems designed to confer authority and
be dispositive-to foreclose choice and surrender authority to the
past. In the context of contemporary constitutional law, it may be a
move from rhetorical to logical syllogism, and perhaps from rhetoric
to authoritarianism. It replaces interpreter with author in a vain attempt to invest authority in author, rather than in interpreter, and to
bypass persuasion and interpretation. This objection notwithstanding,
the rhetoric of the Founders and originalism remains crucial to contemporary constitutional discourse.
V.

VARmIrIEs OF HISTORY

How can historians participate in the originalist enterprise without
undermining their own professional roles or appearing contemptuous
of the professional needs of members of the legal community? Perhaps we might distinguish between "the past" and "history." Historians have no monopoly on the past. Law, for example, is dedicated to
describing past events according to changing sets of norms and giving
them legal 1meanings;
Aristotle's "judicial rhetoric" was largely about
"past fact."' 76 The "past" can be "used to sanction or sanctify authority,"'1 77 and in the two centuries-plus since the Founding, many historians have worked valiantly to provide a usable past.'7 8 The idea of a
usable past has fallen into disfavor among historians, who now concentrate on the pastness of the past,'179 but why must those in other
disciplines, such as law professors, slavishly follow changing standards
of academic history? Today "history" might be defined as "the study
of the past as a systematic discipline;"' 0 or as an intellectual process
of exploring a place, "the past," "as an object of curiosity," while also
seeking "significance, explanation, and meaning."''
But both "the
past" and "history" are equally valid.
Writing about the past and in the interest of originalism, might be
described as "lawyers' legal history;" writing history, as "historians'
legal history." Here I draw upon William E. Nelson, who has wisely
176. Aristotle on Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 15, 176.
177. C. Vann Woodward, The Future of the Past, 75 Am. Hist. Rev. 711, 724 (1970).
178. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in The Disuniting of America (1992) writes:
Historians do their damnedest to maintain the standards of their trade.
Heaven knows how dismally we fall short of our ideals, how sadly our interpretations are dominated and distorted by unconscious preconceptions, how
obsessions of race and nation blind us to our own bias. We remain creatures
of our times, prisoners of our own experience, swayed hither and yon, like
all sinful mortals, by partisanship, prejudice, dogma, by fear and by hope.
I at 46.
179. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, The Past as Authority and Social Critic: Stabilizing
and DestabilizingFunctions of History in Legal Argument, in The Historic Turn in the
Human Sciences, supra note 5, at 339, 363; Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American
Social Science 261-319 (1991).
180. Hexter, supra note 167, at 368.
181. Joyce Appleby, et al., Telling the Truth About History 257 (1994).
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distinguished between lawyers' and historians' legal history.
"'[L]awyers' legal history' is written "to generate data and interpretations that are of use in resolving modem legal controversies.""
"'[H]istorians' legal history"' is "written to provide and support new
and interesting interpretations and bodies of data to advance exploration of the past."'183 Note that Nelson shifts the order here: Whereas
lawyers are interested in data first, and interpretations second, historians focus on interpretations first, and data second. But both seek the
same ends: data and interpretations.
Obviously, the same piece of scholarship can be both historians'
legal history and lawyers' legal history. One excellent example is Wil14
liam Treanor's Fame, the Founding,and the Power to Declare War, 8
which recovers a too frequently neglected historian's article on the
importance of fame to the Founding Fathers,as and shows the way the
Founders' ideas about fame shaped the structure of the Constitution
and the original understanding of the War Powers Clause.186 Treanor
suggests that both the "pro-Executive" scholars who have insisted that
the President possessed the unilateral power to initiate war and the
"pro-Congress" scholars who have maintained that Congress must approve America's entrance into war have missed the point:
The founding generation believed that, if the President could commit the nation to war, his desire for fame might lead him into war
even when war was not in the national interest .... [But] individual
members of Congress would not win fame if the nation went to war
and won. Therefore, Congress alone could be trusted to decide
questions of war correctly. Animated by their concern that Presidents would fall prey to the lure of fame, the Founders thus structured the war power in a way that conflicts with the original
understanding of the War Powers Clause as articulated by previous
scholarship. The Founders intended that the clause would vest in
Congress principal responsibility for initiating conflict; in this regard, pro-Congress scholars have been right and pro-Executive
scholars wrong. But the Founders denied the President a veto over
congressional decisions to wage war, something that all scholars
have missed. 187
If the answer is so easy, why has it eluded so many smart people?
Understandably, according to Treanor, both the pro-executive and
pro-Congress conceptions of the War Powers Clause meant that "the
182. Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1578.
183. Id
184. William Michael Treanor, Fame the Founding,and the Power to Declare War,
82 Cornell L. Rev. 695 (1997).
185. See generally Douglas Adair, Fame and the FoundingFathers,in Fame and the

Founding Fathers 7 (Trevor Colburn ed., 1974).
186. See Treanor, supra note 184.
187. Id. at 700.
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Founders would have wanted to give the President a veto,"'' s and this
blinded scholars.
Whether the original understanding was that the President should
be at the center of decisions on war and peace-as pro-Executive
scholars maintain-or that as many barriers as possible to war
should be imposed-as pro-Congress scholars maintain-presumably both ends are advanced by giving the President a veto. But if
the President's desire for military fame will consistently push him
[or her] towards war, then a veto is pointless because it will not be
exercised. Moreover, because the President's decisionmaking in
this area will be hopelessly corrupted by self-interest, it is reasonable to wholly exclude him [or her] from the warmaking process.
There is, then, a simple reason why the Founders consistently described the decision to declare war as exclusively a legislative deci89
sion: They understood it to be an exclusively legislative decision.'
This is a rare piece of work that bridges the interest of both historians and lawyers and indicates that there really is a (legitimate) place
for historians in law schools. As the new emphasis on interdisciplinarity in law schools, the poor job market for historians, and the
comfort level of law professors' lifestyles bring more historians into
law schools, more of the kind of work we have come to expect from
Treanor, 190 Flaherty, 191 and Robert Kaczorowski'92-what we might
call "the Fordham school" of legal historians-may appear. Perhaps it
is reasonable to hope for more scholarship that is both "valid" for
historians, in the sense that it represents a provocative interpretation
of history, and "valid" for law professors, in the sense that it provides
useful data from the past.
As a historian who does not teach in a law school, and as a former
law student who recalls relishing those instances when law professors'
scholarship seemed relevant to the life I anticipated as a lawyer, I believe it is reasonable to expect historians who opt to teach in law
schools to produce work which is at once both good lawyers' legal
history and good historians' legal history. 19 But why hold non-histo188. Id. at 757.
189. Id at 757-58.
190. See Treanor, supra note 184.
191. See Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 33; Flaherty, History
"Lite," supra note 113.
192. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisionsof the Civil Rights Act
of 1866: A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 Yale L.J. 565 (1989).
193. Such historians might object, however, that it overly imbues their agenda with
presentist concerns. Why, they might ask, should they be required to produce "relevant" work when their colleagues are not? I am aware that legal scholarship has
changed and become more interdisciplinary than it was when I attended law school
twenty years ago. My sense of its transformation led me to write Strange Career,
supra note 7. Not everyone, of course, would agree that a transformation has occurred. See, for example, J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarityas Colonization, 53 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 949, 952 (1996) (suggesting that the law's professional roots prevent it
from becoming truly transformed), and John Henry Schlegel, Talkin' Dirty: Twining's

1997]

BORDER PATROL

nan law professors to this standard? Historians should be satisfied
with getting good "lawyers' legal history" from lawyers and law
professors."
Here, there are some hopeful signs. For example, while pointing to
its presentism and its function as originalism for liberals, historians
have treated Ackerman's Neo-Federalist version of the Founding(s)
more sympathetically than they have treated neo-republicanism. They
Tower and Kalman's Strange Career,21 L & Soc. Inquiry 981 (1996) (reviewing Kalman, Strange Career,supra note 7). But see my response to Schlegel, GarbageMouth,
21 L. & Soc. Inquiry 1001 (1996). As Strange Career,supra note 7, indicates, I feel
ambivalent about the change. As a historian, I am intrigued and gratified by it. It
does my heart good to see law professors reading Wood and Pocock. I also think it
makes sense. I agree with Martin Flaherty that law professors should walk, or do the
reading in secondary sources, before they run, or turn to the primary texts of the
Founding. See Flaherty,The Most DangerousBranch, supra note 33, at 1752-53. As a
historian who concentrates on America in the twentieth century, I am delighted by
the debate about the reception of the New Deal, which has already begun in the legal
community, (see, for example, the sources cited in Strange Career, supra note 6, at
348-51 n.70) and will surely swing into high gear after publication of Bruce Ackerman's second volume of We the People: Transformations (forthcoming).
As a former law student, however, I wonder how this change affects the classroom
and find myself with more sympathy for the complaints of Judge Harry Edwards
about the impractical nature of contemporary legal education than I would have
imagined. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession,91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992). To quote James White:
There is a risk... that people who should be in the departments of History,
Philosophy, or Economics will come to the law school not because of a sincere interest in the law, but because there are more places in the law and
because those places carry better salaries and more perquisites.
James T. White, Letter to Judge Harry Edwards,91 Mich. L Rev. 2177,2179 (1993). In
part because I am uncertain how one measures "a sincere interest in the law," I take
this risk more seriously than White does.
194. But see generally Mark Tushnet, InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship: The Case
of History-in-Law, 71 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 909 (1996) [hereinafter Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship] (distinguishing between "history-in-law"--what I have been
calling lawyers' legal history-and legal history). Tushnet cites the scholarship on
modem civic republicanism as an example of history-in-law. "[History-in-law does
not really try to explain what people in the past thought." Id. at 933. It follows that
criteria by which "history-in-law" must be judged is by whether "[ilts creators ...
have substantially affected the way we think about law, whether or not they have
taught us much about the past." Id. at 932. Tshnet maintains: "Law-office history is
a legal practice, not a historical one. The criteria for evaluating it, for determining
what is a successful performance must be drawn from legal practice rather than from
historical practice." Id. at 934-35. I am with him up this point. But for Tushnet, that
means one can write "good" history-in-law even if he or she bungles the facts. Id. at
932-34, 935 n.105.
I cannot bring myself to go that far. First, I agree with Martin Flaherty- "Legal
arguments relying on economics, philosophy, or sociology are more convincing when
they comport with the standards set by those disciplines. Nothing prevents the same
point from applying to arguments based upon history." Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 33, at 1749. Even if one disagrees with Flaherty and me on this
point, I follow him in falling back on a childhood aphorism. "lilt is worth pursuing
[the historical inquiry] on the theory that something worth doing at all is worth doing
well." Id. at 1747. While I hesitate to define "well" in this context, I would say that at
a minimum, it includes doing one's best to get the facts right.
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have even been more supportive of Ackerman in print than law
professors have. (Admittedly, that is not saying much.) 95 Sometimes
one can even think that historians, on the one hand, and lawyers and
law professors, on the other, are rising above their traditional antagonism to develop a more effective partnership.
Compare what liberal lawyers did with original intent in Brown v.
Board of Education'96 and the abortion cases. 197 In Brown, Thurgood
Marshall recruited historians to massage the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to demonstrate that their
drafters would have supported school desegregation. 98 In a sense, he
was successful. Though the Court ultimately dodged the issue in
Brown, Marshall's historians produced an originalist argument, and
the first question asked about any theory of original intent advanced
today is whether it would permit the Court to reach the result it did in
Brown. 99 But one of the historians on Marshall's team, Alfred Kelly,
later lamented:
I am very much afraid that ... I ceased to function as and instead

took up the practice of law without a license. The problem we faced
was not the historian's discovery of the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth; the problem instead was the formulation of
an adequate gloss on the fateful events of 1866 sufficient to convince
the Court that we had something of an historical case ....

It is not

that we were engaged in formulating lies; there was nothing as
crude and naive as that. But we were using facts, emphasizing facts,
bearing down on facts, sliding off facts in a way to do 200
what Marshall
said we had to do-"get by those boys down there."
195. See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 212-21.
196. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
197. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
198. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education
and Black America's Search for Equality 617-41 (1976); Mark Tushnet, Making Civil
Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961, at 196-200 (1994)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law]. For the argument that the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment supported the holding in Brown that
school desegregation was unconstitutional, see McConnell, Originalismand the Desegregation Decisions,supra note 38; Michael W. McConnell, The OriginalistJustification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1937 (1995). Contra
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism,and ConstitutionalTheory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995). See also Tushnet, Interdisciplinary
Legal Scholarship,supra note 194, at 918-24.
199. See McConnell, Originalismand the DesegregationDecisions,supra note 38, at
952 ("In the fractured discipline of constitutional law, there is something very close to
a consensus that Brown was inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps at an extremely high and indeterminate level of
abstraction."). Perhaps, but I believe that consensus is largely unpublished-if not
unspoken. But see Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 86, at 12-13, 268-72,
295-96 (arguing very explicitly that acceptance of a truly originalist understanding
would mean Brown was wrong).
200. See Kluger, supra note 198, at 640. On the other hand, another member of the
team, the distinguished historian John Hope Franklin, thought "his scholarship 'did
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Nearly thirty years later, Professor Sylvia Law and two lawyers filed
an amicus curiae brief for several hundred American historians,201 including Kerber, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,"na a brief
that was resubmitted in Casey.? 3 Some things remained the same:
Here, as in Brown, originalism was assumed to lend added credibility
to the policy argument, particularly because the Supreme Court had
recently said that liberty interests were "fundamental" and protected
by the due process clause only when "rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."0 ° Much, however, was different: few historians still
realistically hoped to uncover "the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, ' 20 5 and historians need not twist history to demonstrate that
eighteenth and nineteenth-century Americans tolerated abortion. 2°
Historians are happier about their collaboration with lawyers in Webster, Casey, and other recent cases than Alfred Kelly was in Brown207
For example, in an article addressed to historians, entitled The Webster Brief. History as Advocacy, or Would You Sign It?,20 Michael
Grossberg answered his question with a fairly resounding "yes." He
concluded: "As a historian who has written on the history of abortion,
I signed the original brief; upon reflection, I would sign it again."120 9
By my lights, as a historian, more credible originalism and improved
lawyers' legal history represents modest progress.

not suffer' from transforming the information he came up with into 'an urgent plea for

justice."' Tuslmet, Making Civil Rights Law, supra note 198, at 198.

201. See Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici CuriaeSupporting Appellees,
The Pub. Historian, Summer 1990, at 57. More than a hundred additional historians
added their names as signatories after the brief was filed. Id.
202. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
203. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
204. Michael L v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 & n.6 (1989) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). For the point that Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael
H. constricted the formulation of "history and tradition" set down by Justice Powell in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), see Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, supra note 134, at 271-72.
205. For a discussion of developments in historians' attitudes towards truth and
objectivity since Kelly's observations about historians' role in Brown, see, for example, Novick, supra note 45, at 508-99; Joyce Appleby et al, supra note 181, at 198-237.
206. See generally James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 (1978).
207. See Otis L. Graham, Jr., Roundtable Historiansand the Webster Case, The
Pub. Historian, Summer 1990, at 9; Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 198-208.
208. Michael Grossberg, The Webster Brie. History as Advocacy, or Would You
Sign it?, The Pub. Historian, Summer 1990, at 45.
209. ld. at 52. Not everyone's "yes" was as resounding. See, for example, James C.
Mohr, Historically Based Legal Brieft: Observations of a Participantin the Webster
Process,The Pub. Historian, Summer 1990, at 19. Mohr nevertheless maintains: "If
asked whether that document comports more fully with my understanding of the past
than the historical arguments mounted by the other side, some of which also cite my
work, I would state strongly that it does. Consequently, I had no hesitation signing
Law's statement to the Court." Id.at 25.

120
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THE POWER OF THE PAST-AND THE UNIVERSITY

What scares me is the prospect that originalism may not be so easily
cabined. The past is powerful. It seems a short step from acknowledging the past can lend or deny authority to the argument that "our
history and tradition" forbid abortion, when that serves the argument,
to deriving "lessons" from the past and inviting the past to confer authority. For example, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson frequently cited their desire to avoid another "Munich" as they took the
United States down the road to Vietnam. If they were only appealing
to memories of Munich as a convenient and useful shorthand for legitimating escalation, I would be unconcerned (although I believe the
policy of escalation was unwise). But for many of their generation,
"Munich" was not persuasive but authoritative. It became a call to a
certain kind of action; it led to, as much as it legitimated, escalation. 1
If historical analogies exercise real power, it is as important that the
right analogies be selected as it is that we "translate" properly when
211
translation is the preferred mode of constitutional interpretation.
But how do policy-makers know which historical analogies are
"right"? Listening to the tape recordings of Lyndon Johnson's recently released telephone conversations, I have been impressed anew
by an old point-that the Korean analogy was more important than
any other analogy, including Munich, as Johnson and his advisers decided on their policy with respect to Vietnam in 1964 and 1965.212 But
what exactly were the "lessons of Korea" and what did the analogy of
"Korea" mean to them? Consider just three of the many possible
meanings. One: "Long, limited wars in Asia are unpopular with the
American people, causing political difficulties for their leaders, as they
did for Truman-stay out!" Another: "Stand firm, use 'reasonable'
force, hold the line; 'saving' South Vietnam will be regarded as a Cold
War victory in much the same way as 'saving' South Korea had become perceived as a Cold War victory." Still another: "Long, limited
wars in Asia are unpopular with the American people, causing polit210. See Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in
American Foreign Policy 112-16 (1973). The Munich analogy may have meant more
to Kennedy, who as a young man had traveled in Europe on the eve of World War II,
than it did for Johnson. But its echoes were felt by all Vietnam advisers. At the July
22, 1965 meeting on Vietnam, George Ball outlined his doubts about escalation, arguing at length that Vietnam was not Korea. Id at 109-10. At the end of the meeting,
Henry Cabot Lodge, the former Ambassador to Vietnam, spoke: "I feel there is a
greater threat to start World War m if we don't go in. Can't we see the similarity to
our own indolence at Munich? I simply can't be as pessimistic as Ball." Yuen Foong
Khong, Analogies at War. Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, at 129 (1992). What is striking, as Khong noted, is that no one, including
Ball, queried Lodge's Munich analogy. Id. at 134.
211. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365 (1997)
(positing a theory of fidelity based in the practice of translation).
212. See Khong, supra note 210, at 97; Richard E. Neustadt & Ernest R. May,
Thinking in Tme: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers 87 (1986).
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ical difficulties for their leaders, as they did for Truman, so let's go in
and not be squeamish; we must be prepared to use tactical nuclear
weapons against the North Vietnamese." The analogy cut different
ways for different individuals at different times. Like precedent
and
2 13
Founders' intent, historical analogies can be indeterminate
When the past involves the Founders, it is especially powerful. The
legal community sometimes seems to suffer from "Founders' envy," a
slavish reverence for the Founders. As Mark Tushnet has said:
[i]n a sense historians' ... rediscovery of republicanism has been
appropriated by constitutional lawyers in the same way we always
appropriate historical work, by converting it into a hagiograpihical
...yearning for restoration of what we have lost. Concerned that
we will be unable to develop cogent defenses for what we find attractive in republican thought, we re-present this thought to our2 14
selves as valuable because 'the framers' thought it was valuable
From a historian's point of view, that is unfortunate. Yet, both historical analogies and history are useful for justification, advocacy, and
analysis. Indeed, we cannot work free of them. Historians generally
echo Robert Gordon in emphasizing that the past is so different from
the present that recognition of historical contingency is liberating and
empowering,2 15 even as we may recognize, as Stanley Fish would remind us, that we are succumbing to "anti-foundationalist theory
hope" and that "contingency acknowledged" can never be "contingency transcended. 2 16 Even though, as historians, we vainly try not
to draw lessons from the past in our work, we continually draw lessons
from the past in our lives (and especially in department meetings).
Yet, it remains useful to acknowledge historical contingency, and in
any event, historians are paid to do so. Because our focus is on
change, we want to linger over the differences between past and present. In the case of Vietnam, we want to play the part of George
Ball, 17 focusing on the differences, rather than on the similarities, between Korea and Vietnam: "no march across the border [of South
Vietnam, as of South Korea]; no solid government [in South Vietnam,
as inSouth Korea]; no resilient army [in South Vietnam, as in South
Korea]; no ward-of-U.N. status [for South Vietnam, as for South Korea]; no U.N. resolution [with respect to South Vietnam, as opposed
213. Consider, for example, how many different historical analogies were appealed
to as Americans became aware of the Bosnian crisis. Otis L. Graham, Jr., Editor's
Corner: The History Watch, The Pub. Historian, Summer 1993, at 7, 11-14.
214. Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition, supra note 138, at 96.
215. See Stanley Fish, Rhetoric, in Doing What Comes Naturally, supra note 170, at
471, 523-24.
216. Id. at 524.
217. See Neustadt & May, supra note 212, at 87, 162; see also Khong, supra note
210, at 97,107-117, 126-28,136-37,228. Ball told Khong: "I would suggest to you that
if we had not gone into Korea, I think it would have been very unlikely that we would
have gotten into Vietnam." Id at 97.
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'
to South Korea], and so forth."218
We want to argue that Vietnam is
not Korea.
Similarly, in Webster and Casey, historian Estelle Freedman, a signatory of the historians' brief, would have preferred to recognize that
"the history of abortion practice in America is characterized more by
change than by continuity, '219 even though some women have always
tried to abort. In the eighteenth century, many women possessed
powerful economic and religious reasons for reproduction that many
contemporary women may lack. Freedman questioned "the strategy
of refuting one static historical argument with another." 0 She probably spoke for many historians when she agreed that our studies
"should illuminate the ways the law needs to change in response to
history, rather than the ways history supports a particular legal interpretation."'" She said: "I wish that lawyers could have found a legal
basis to argue that women need reproductive choice today precisely
because our lives differ from those of our foremothers even more than
our lives resemble those of
women in the past, despite our shared re222
productive vulnerability."
Forced to consider what form originalism should take, I suspect historians would follow Freedman in finding a combination of noninterpretivism and changed circumstances the least obnoxious form of
originalism, largely because it calls attention to the changes in context
historians too frequently favor over continuity 223 and text.224 Yet, the
law professors most sensitive to history dismiss such a theory as fantasy. 25 To paraphrase them, to convert actors in our legal culture,
one must speak their language. 226 As Freedman herself acknowledged, "the constraints of the legal theory within which we operate"
made it essential for the historians' brief to rebut the solicitor general's "original intent" argument with another originalist version. 22
If historians are to express our activist instincts by working with
lawyers, we must play by lawyers' rules. But let us remember that
lawyers' rules change, and that some day the differences between both
past and present, and "past" and "history," may again become impor218. Neustadt & May, supra note 212, at 87.
219. Estelle Freedman, Historical Interpretationand Legal Advocacy: Rethinking
the Webster Amicus Brief, The Pub. Historian, Summer 1990, at 27, 30.

220. Id. at 28.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 31.
223. See Samuel P. Hays, On the Meaning and Analysis of Change in History, in
Theory, Method, and Practice in Social and Cultural History 33, 47-53 (Peter Karsten

& John Modell eds., 1992).
224. See Onuf, supra note 51, at 365.
225. See Ahkil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Document,
97 Yale L.J. 281, 293 (1987).

226. See Ahkil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III Separating the
Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 207-208 n.7 (1985).
227. Freedman, supra note 219, at 31.
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tant to constitutional theory. If the tide turns, and the Court again
espouses the "Living Constitutionalism" of the Warren Court days,
then we and the lawyers, law professors, and judges we try to assist
may again benefit from stressing historical contingency? For that
reason alone, we should remind ourselves that in an important sense,
the past indeed remains a "foreign country." 9
If the current need to find continuity with the past casts its own
spell over law professors, so does the university. Another potential
pitfall to working in the past is posed by law professors who chafe at
the disciplinary boundaries between law and history. A pat on the
head from the history police-turf-conscience historians who pass
judgment on the (ab)use of "our" discipline-for using the past better
in Webster and Casey than in Brown does not satisfy these academic
lawyers. Rather, in their quest to fashion new roles for themselves as
they careen between the profession and the rest of the university,
some law professors yearn to become "real historians." Ironically,
just as historians who have long complained of lawyers' approach to
the past recognize originalism's power and value, some of the law
professors who drank at the wells of neo-republicanism, (such as Ackerman and Suzanna Sherry), have begun hurling the word "originalist" against each other as an insult?'
By my lights as a historian, such law professors have become too
interdisciplinary, and they risk becoming the captive of another discipline. And there is a time lag. Now time lags are characteristic of
interdisciplinary travel: In the 1980s, historians made Clifford Geertz
their "patron saint,"' 31 just as he was challenged by younger anthropologists, 2 who had found deconstruction after it became "old hat"
among English professors.3 3 Here the time lag is reflected by the fact
that the law professors join an older generation of historians in criticizing lawyers' legal history, or law office history, instead of seeking
improved law office history. We have seen that today's historiansthose involved in the abortion cases, for example-are more tolerant
of originalism than their predecessors. It seems both bizarre and un228. In that instance, I might well join Fleming in urging historians to do "'fit'
work." Fleming, Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note 31, at 1345.
229. See David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country 232-33 0985).
230. See e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 63, 72-73 n.4 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) (criticizing Amar for originalism); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of
Liberalism Past, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 918, 933-34 (1992) (book review) (reprimanding
Ackerman for originalism).
231. See John Higham, New Directions in American Intellectual History xi, xvi
(1979).
232. For a discussion of new developments in anthropology, see, Writing Culture:
The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (James Clifford and George E. Marcus eds.,
1986); see also Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 7, at 125-27.
233. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech: And It's A
Good Thing Too 271 (1994).
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fortunate that the law professors would become dismissive of originalism just as historians are coming to appreciate its importance for legal
discourse.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE PAST

Thus, I recognize the rhetoric of originalism as a current necessity.
Like Jack Rakove, "I happen to like originalist arguments when the
weight of the evidence seems to support the constitutional outcomes I
favor-and that may be as good a clue to the appeal of originalism as
any other." 2 4 I do fear originalism confers too much authority and
power on the past, and I would hope we distinguish the originalist
enterprise of finding continuity between past and present from historians' current conception of history. But both historians and law
professors should acknowledge the value of originalism to legal
discourse.
More generally, we should recognize that both writing about the
past and writing history, both lawyers' legal history and historians'
legal history, are valuable. In fact, since neither yields determinate
answers, both efforts are doomed to failure. Lawyers, law professors,
and judges can never be certain they have uncovered "original intent"
in the past. So, too, our contemporary perspectives make some eras
more interesting than others to historians at different times and inevitably interfere with our professional attempts to present any era from
the perspective of its subjects.3 5 Thus each generation must write its
own history, just as each generation of law professors must develop its
own constitutional theory. But both enterprises are edifying, and we
should recognize that originalism and credible lawyers' legal history
are as important as credible historians' legal history. Historians
should pay less attention to policing our disciplinary borders and more
to figuring out how we can cross them to open a dialogue with lawyers, judges, and law professors. For what we all say about the past
and history tells us something about the past and history but even
more about ourselves.

234. Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 48, at xv n.*; see also Rakove, Fidelity
Through History (Or To It), supra note 165, at 1600-05.
235. Law professors have been slow to come to grips with historians' generally
cheerful acceptance of the indeterminacy of history. Some academic lawyers, however, are beginning to take note of it. See Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 437 (1996).

